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                           THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: CAUSES AND LESSONS 
        Kenneth E. Scott 
     
        Part I – The Crisis 
  This policy workshop is occasioned quite obviously by the events of the 
last several years and the enormous expenditures that resulted, as losses 
cascaded through the financial system (and beyond) and governments shifted  
those losses to taxpayers in an effort to combat a severe recession or worse. 
There is now agreement by all that this experience should not be repeated, but 
the first step is to understand how such huge losses were created.  Can we 
institute some regulatory reforms that give us confidence that it will be 
prevented from happening again?  Are there better ways to deal with the 
problem of financial institutions that are “too big to fail”?   
  A lot happened even before the perceived beginning of this crisis in 2007,  
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so although the events are recent, I will review the period from 2001 to date, as 
part of our inquiry into the lessons to be learned.  Much of it is probably familiar, 
but worth revisiting. 
    This necessarily simplified account is divided into 3 stages: first, a look at 
the key factors that led to the increasing riskiness of US home mortgages; 
second, how those risks were transmitted as securities from US housing lenders 
to institutional investors around the globe; and third, how those risks led to 
huge losses and created a credit crunch that moved the impact from the 
financial economy to the real economy.  The goal is to lay a factual foundation 
for deriving the lessons that ought to be taken away from this very expensive 
experience. 
I. CAUSATION 
  Starting points in an historical account are somewhat arbitrary, but I will 
begin with the monetary policy followed by the Fed after the dot.com bust of 
2000.  Concerned about deflation and the Japanese stagnation of the 1990s, the 
Fed in 2001 abruptly lowered its target rate from 6.5% to under 2%, and then 
kept it at 1% until July of 2004, as shown in Slide 1.  The inflation rate over this 
period was around 2%, so the real rate of interest was negative.  Needless to 




  For most households, the largest and most heavily debt financed purchase 
they will ever make is to buy a home, so housing demand in particular is rate 
sensitive and responded strongly to the monetary stimulus.   With plentiful and 
cheap liquidity, some of it also coming from the trade surplus investments of the 
Asian export economies,  a steady increase in house prices was the result.  Slide 




  US housing policy for some time has been to encourage home ownership, 
and a number of government agencies were formed to support housing finance.  
Government Sponsored Enterprises or GSEs (Fannie and Freddie) would insure 
residential mortgages that met their standards, for a fee.  They would also buy 
the loans and put them into a pool, which could then be sold to private 
investors, thereby providing funds for additional purchases from banks and 
mortgage originators.  The GSEs thus led the way for the development of a 
securitization market for conventional mortgages.  
  Congress from about 1977 on embarked on a program to expand 
mortgage lending to minorities and LMIs (low and moderate income groups).  It 
began modestly with the Community Reinvestment Act, to prevent “redlining” of 5 
 
certain urban areas in which a bank was allegedly refusing to lend at all, but 
shifted in 1995 to measuring the volume of loans to LMI borrowers by banks and 
then to establishing ever-growing “targets” (beginning at 30% and ultimately 
reaching 55%) for the percentage of “affordable housing” loans in all those 
bought or guaranteed by the GSEs.   The goal was to push home ownership rates 
ever higher, and it involved pushing credit standards ever lower. 
  The process reached its zenith after the creation and promotion of 
“subprime” loans – loans to borrowers with poor credit scores (<660), multiple 
recent mortgage delinquencies or foreclosures, DSIs (debt service to income 
ratios) of >50%, and the like.  With a somewhat better credit score, the loans 
were called “Alt-A”.  Conventional down payment requirements of 20% dropped 
to as low as 3.5% for the GSEs (and to zero for some private originators), 
because significant down payments were viewed as “barriers” for low-income 
families.  
   New products were invented, to make mortgages more “affordable” for 
buyers with very limited income or resources, and for owners drawing out their 
equity in refinancing.  Adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) evolved into “hybrid” 
ARMs with low initial rates which would reset to market rates after two or three 
years, or “option” ARMs in which the buyer could chose the monthly payment.  
Interest-only (IO) loans involved no amortization of principal for a period of 10 
or 15 years.  Down payments could be borrowed through a second mortgage.  
Approval processes were automated; income statements were not verified, and 
such ‘no-doc’ loans became commonplace.  6 
 
  The private sector entered subprime lending in a large way, selling the 
mortgages not only to the GSEs but into a burgeoning private securitization 
market.  [Private (non-GSE backed) issuance of subprime and Alt-A securities 
amounted to around $560 billion in 2004, $830 billion in 2005, $840 billion in 
2006, and $470 billion in 2007 (with only $4 billion in 2008), for a total of about 
$2.7 trillion.]   
  Was all of this based on “predatory lending” or borrower fraud?  No doubt 
one can find an amount of misrepresentation on both sides, but that is not really 
the story.  Both borrowers and lenders were expecting HPA to create some 
equity and enable a sale or refinance of the property when the resets hit, and 
under those circumstances they were both acting quite rationally without any 
need for deception.  Borrowers, with little or no down payments (or remaining 
equity), had nothing much to lose financially.  (Indeed in about half the states, 
mortgage loans are legally non-recourse; the buyer can walk away without any 
personal liability.)  In effect, buyers were renting at the low initial rates, with an 
option to purchase at the reset date.  Mortgage originators or lenders were not 
keeping the credit risk, but selling it into investor pools, which I next examine. 
II. TRANSMISSION 
  Mortgage securitization had begun simply, with bundling of conventional 
mortgages insured by a GSE into a pool, shares in which could be sold to 
investors as reasonably safe securities with the borrowers diversified across 
geographical regions and economies.  But with the advent of an increasing 
volume of subprime mortgages, it became more complicated.  Investors wanted 
higher returns, but they also wanted safety.  (A first principle of finance theory is 7 
 
that they move in opposite directions, but put that aside.)   So, to simplify, 
claims on the cash flow of the residential mortgage-backed pools (RMBS) were 
divided into “tranches” or levels of seniority, with those at the bottom first to 
take losses or shortfalls in payments and those at the top holding first claims 
viewed as quite secure, with relatively low contractual return entitlements and 
AAA ratings. 
  It was not difficult to sell the AAA tranches, but there was less demand for 
lower ratings.  The solution: put the lower tranches into a new pool combined 
with the tranches of a hundred other pools, and create a new hierarchy of claims 
in a collateralized mortgage obligations (CMO) pool.  Then repeat the process, 
and add in some other kinds of consumer debt (auto loans, credit card loans, 
student loans, etc.) and perhaps some commercial loans, and form a 
collateralized debt obligations (CDO) pool.  The process of creating asset-backed 
securities (ABS) need not, and did not, stop there.  It continued into CDO
2 pools – 




  As you went down this securitization chain, the actual original loans 
underlying it all were becoming farther and farther removed from the securities 
held by investors.  So to provide some reassurance and maintain the AAA 
ratings, various forms of “credit enhancement” were used.  Municipal bond 
insurers ventured into insuring these new kinds of bonds; credit default swaps 
(CDS) were purchased to shift some of credit risk off investors.  Reliable 
estimates are hard to come by, but aggregate issuances (2004-2008) of MBS 
securitizations (agency and private) may have amounted to something on the 
order of $9 trillion, bought up to their current regret by institutional investors all 
around the globe. 
III. LOSSES   9 
 
  Six years or so of constantly accelerating HPA could not go on forever, as 
is true of any exponential function.  The exact moment when a bubble will burst 
seems impossible to predict, but burst it did [Slide 4] at the end of 2006.   
 
Slide 4 
With house prices now falling and resets coming on line, subprime delinquencies 





House values quickly fell below the amount of the mortgage debt (since there 
was no significant downpayment cushion) and the embedded option was clearly 
out of the money.  These “underwater” loans went into default and foreclosure, 
and the lower tranches of MBS pools incurred losses, while the upper tranches 
were obviously becoming more risky and hence declining in value. 
  This process inevitably affected subsequent pools down the chain, but by 
how much?  In a given MBS pool, one could observe the defaults and at least in 
theory use the information on thousands of borrowers to try to model future 
performance.  But for subsequent pools, the information on the underlying 
original loans was lacking and the complexity made credible estimates of risks 
and losses nearly impossible, as I have written elsewhere [Attachment A].  The 11 
 
rating agencies knew trouble was coming and in 2007 started downgrading more 
and more ABS issues.  Their value became indeterminate and trading in them 
dried up, which eliminated external market prices, while their acceptability as 
collateral diminished accordingly.  
  What made the situation even worse was that there was poor disclosure 
of the positions held by the various investors in subprime loans and securities 
based on them – in particular, by commercial banks and investment banks, and 
some hedge funds.  Those who had created these securities were among the 
largest holders.  They were at the heart of the credit markets in the financial 
system, and they were with great reluctance announcing writedowns in their 
positions.  The common belief was that both agency downgrades and bank 
writedowns were significantly lagging the actual loss of economic value, and 
hence there was a spreading concern with the solvency of counterparties among 
participants in the inter-bank and prime brokerage markets.  
  The growing appreciation of the seriousness of the problem throughout 
2007 was followed by the dramatic failures of 2008, culminating in September: 
the GSEs (Fannie and Freddie), which owned or guaranteed $5.4 trillion of 
mortgage debt, were taken over and put into conservatorships on the 7
th; 
Merrill Lynch was forced into acquisition by Bank of America on the 14
th; 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy on the 15
th; and the Fed made an $85 billion 
bailout loan to AIG on the 16
th.  On the 19
th the Treasury Secretary announced 
a “bold approach” to “remove these illiquid assets that are…threatening our 
economy” and requested a massive appropriation to forestall a complete 
collapse; the effect on the market was immediate [Slides 6, 7].  Contrary to 12 
 
popular lore, the Lehman failure and refusal to bail it out was not a fatal trigger 









  On Oct. 1 the $700 billion TARP bill was signed into law.  The initial 
interpretation of increasing credit stringency throughout 2007 and 2008 was 
that MBS weren’t trading because of a liquidity problem.  The Fed constantly 
lowered its federal funds target rate (it is now close to 0), opened the discount 
window wide, and came up with a host of new lending facilities – but they still 
didn’t trade.  TARP was first conceived as a program to purchase MBS off bank 
balance sheets, but immediately ran into the valuation problem.  So on Oct. 14 
the Treasury converted it into a program to inject $250 billion into bank equity, 
in an effort to address concerns among banks over counterparty solvency. 14 
 
  Not surprisingly, credit cutoffs and insolvency fears spread from the 
financial sector into the real economy around the world, financing for business 
and international trade plummeted, and a severe recession was well underway.  
But it is not the purpose of this paper to examine the measures taken by various 
governments to deal with the consequences of the financial market crisis, and the 
effectiveness of the different remedies attempted.  My focus is on the primary 
causes, and the ideas of how to prevent its reoccurrence, not on all the 
secondary effects. 
          Part II -- Lessons 
  What were the critical mistakes and deficiencies in the account we have 
just reviewed?  The media, participants and politicians have put forth a host of 
favorite culprits, usually shifting blame to someone else: MBS securities, rating 
agencies, excessively compensated CEOs, CDSs, deregulation, greed, mark-to-
market accounting, predatory lenders, repeal of Glass-Steagall, hybrid ARMs, 
short selling of bank stocks, borrower fraud,  dishonest mortgage brokers, 
inadequate consumer protection for financial products, and so on.  It would take 
a lot more time than I have to try to deal with each of them, and it’s probably 
unnecessary.  Some are minor factors or even irrelevant to the crisis, whatever 
their independent merits, but I will try to take up the more salient in three broad 
categories: defects in financial products, defects in risk management, and defects 
in government policy. 
I. FINANCIAL PRODUCTS 15 
 
  CDS, or derivatives in general, have received a lot of the blame for the 
crisis.  But CDS created none of the losses borne by subprime lenders or mortgage 
investors.  They are an instrument for transferring, and thereby spreading, some 
of the risk, and they worked as designed.  The CDS in the Lehman failure, and in 
the GSEs and others, were all settled and paid promptly.  (In addition, they served 
as a good measure of changing risk perceptions.)  Of course, AIG wrote far too 
many customized CDS on MBS for too low a price, but that was a defect in 
judgment, not in the derivative instrument. 
    Subprime lending often took the form of hybrid loans, with low initial rates 
and resets after two or three years to market rates, and borrower income was 
ignored or not checked.  In effect, mortgage lending became collateral-based 
rather than borrower-based.  There is nothing intrinsically unsound about lending 
on collateral, but lending on collateral-appreciation was the real problem.  The 
Fed in 2008 reacted by prohibiting subprime loans without regard to ability to 
repay from income or net worth.  Data show that the best predictors of default 
are the size of the downpayment and credit history – factors that are politically 
sensitive and not addressed by the new rule. 
  The subprime loan problem was magnified by the securitization process, so 
should securitization be banned – for example, by permitting banks to issue 
covered bonds but not form ABS pools?  Pools offer wide diversification across 
localities and borrower characteristics, raise capital and shift risk from the 
banking system to other institutional investors (as do CDS).  (But in a recession, 
the correlation between mortgage loans and other forms of consumer credit 
proved much higher than anticipated, so the diversification benefit was modest.) 16 
 
  The greater difficulty as already noted was that the complexity, created as 
tranches went down the line from the original RMBS pool into additional layers of 
pools, rendered the securities “toxic” – incapable of being reliably valued or sold.  
In my view, the remedy for that is clear if challenging.  It is not clear that such a 
degree of complexity is economically warranted or will revive.  But to whatever 
extent securitization does revive, one change seems essential. 
  The SEC could by rule mandate detailed disclosure of the characteristics 
and performance of all loans in original pools and all tranches in subsequent ones, 
which would then be aggregated in a central data repository available to all.  This 
would enable rating agencies (and others) to model the initial risk and adjust to 
monthly performance information.  It would also facilitate evaluation of rating 
agency performance and the entry of new competitors who believed they had 
superior models.  Various detailed proposals along these lines exist, but they are 
yet to be implemented. 
II. FIRM RISK MANAGEMENT 
  It is obvious that there was almost universal underestimation of the risks 
being incurred.  Some of it seems related to agency costs and incentive problems, 
but it goes beyond that.  Does the answer lie in regulation, or corporate 
governance changes, or in a learning process that has already occurred? 
  Mortgage originators (brokers or bank affiliates) retained very little credit 
risk on the loans they made; they just took in fees and sold on the loans.  The 
agency problem is evident, and contractual arrangements tried to bound it with 
representations and warranties, holding periods, and put-back clauses.  They 17 
 
didn’t work very well, because they were poorly drafted and many of the brokers 
had very thin capital in relation to their loan volume.  The GSEs automated their 
acceptance process to meet their constantly rising “targets”, and lost the ability to 
monitor underwriting effectively, while the banks formed pools in ‘bankruptcy-
remote’ entities and sold on the ownership of credit risk.  Or so they believed, 
until they found themselves with large holdings on their own balance sheets, and 
having for reputational concerns to take back responsibility for some of their SPEs 
(special purpose entities). 
  The SPE accounting rules are now changed, acceptable mortgage 
originators now have to hold loans for longer periods and have higher capital 
margins, and the CEOs who oversaw these operations have now mostly lost their 
jobs and a great deal of their net worth.  So some lessons have in fact already 
been learned, but why were they needed?  There are several different theories. 
    One is that the top management in these giant financial institutions didn’t 
understand what their underlings were doing.  If that was the case, the 
compensation incentives to look at are not just those of the CEOs but those of the 
traders and lenders making the actual decisions.  Their payouts should reflect the 
maturity or duration of their decisions’ risk.  To some extent that is already 
happening.  But to focus attention on the level of compensation of top 
management (as opposed to the design of the incentive structure) panders to 
public anger while misidentifying the important issues. 
  Another is that deposit insurance and other features of the government 
safety net for banks (including bailouts), as well as the tax code, make debt 18 
 
cheaper and thereby subsidized leverage and led bank management to take 
excessive risk quite rationally, regardless of its compensation structure.  To offset 
this, supervisors rely on prudential regulation and capital requirements, but both 
have significant limitations, to be explored below. 
  Still another is that neither the top management nor those below 
understood that there was a bubble rising, though the HPA information was there 
for all to see, nor did they appreciate its implications.  If that was the case, 
measures such as requiring the board to oversee a chief risk officer, as has been 
suggested, may be of little help.  It is hard to mandate foresight.  Some urge that 
the solution is to have a government systemic risk regulator (SRR), and we’ll turn 
to that below. 
III. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND REGULATION 
  What role did government regulation and policies play in this sorry tale?  
There is a lot of media talk of deregulation, or regulatory gaps or loopholes, being 
the cause.  What were they, exactly?  It is necessary to distinguish between 
regulatory authority and regulatory performance, and I will begin with regulatory 
authority.  My contention is that in most instances there was ample existing 
authority for US regulators to have addressed these issues, if they had perceived 
the need and acted on it. 
  Some point to the fact that derivatives were largely unregulated—which 
ones, and what was the critical missing requirement?  There are only two 
prospects  which figured in my prior tale: 19 
 
    1) MBS/ABS?  They were not derivatives but securities, and always 
subject to regulation as such.  I believe disclosure was inadequate in critical ways, 
but it was not because authority was lacking. 
    2) CDS?  As noted, they were not a cause of losses in subprime 
mortgages or securities, but a mechanism to spread that risk.  In doing so, they 
did create a potential for spillovers that sellers may have underestimated and 
inadequately hedged, but again those are among the secondary effects that are 
beyond the scope of this paper.   
  Some find a case for a new consolidated consumer financial protection 
agency, since that function is now divided in the US among a number of agencies.  
If by consumer we mean household investors, MBS/ABS were bought almost 
entirely by large institutions, not retail investors.  If we mean borrowers, the Fed 
and other banking agencies had extensive regulations already on the books—so 
extensive that probably no one would argue that they could not be made more 
comprehensible.  But again, a lack of authority is not the issue. 
  Was there insufficient authority to regulate the issuers of all those 
subprime mortgages and securities?  Most all of them were made or funded by 
banks that were heavily regulated by the Fed or OCC or FDIC – it is hard to find an 
absence of authority to have imposed higher credit standards there.  The 
question is why the legal authority wasn’t used more effectively. 
  Some believe the capital requirements for banks were too low, so they 
should be increased, perhaps on a progressive scale for larger institutions.  Of 
course, ex post it is clear that capital was too low in any insolvent institution, by 20 
 
definition.  But ex ante, how does one determine the proper amount to require?  
Under the Basel rules, a bank is “adequately capitalized” if it has a total risk-based 
capital ratio of at least 8%.  The 8% number has no analytic foundation; it was 
simply the average ratio prevailing in the banking industry at the time.  Banks are 
not “significantly undercapitalized” unless the ratio is below 6%, and not unless 
the ratio of tangible equity to total assets is below 2% are they viewed as 
“critically undercapitalized” in the US (and subject to imminent closure if more 
capital is not immediately raised). 
  When assets are “risk-adjusted” (downward) according to an elaborate 
schedule to determine a ratio denominator, it opens up opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage.  Of especial relevance to this analysis is the fact that 
residential mortgages were awarded a risk weight of only 50%, thus lowering the 
capital charge.  But if a bank sold a portfolio of its mortgages to a MBS pool and 
received back an equivalent amount of AAA securities, the risk weight dropped to 
20%.  For a bank “adequately capitalized” at 8%, that meant the bank was 
required to carry only 1.6% of capital against the credit risk.  That would not 
sustain much of a market downturn. 
  Of course, one could institute different risk weights or larger capitalization 
numbers.  But whatever the number, it rests ultimately on the value of the assets, 
and this crisis has shown how questionable some of those values can be.  Banks 
have strong incentives to overstate asset values and understate losses.    Capital 
requirements are dependent on the reliability of measurements of asset values, 
and banks (aided by politicians in both the US and the EU) have pushed 
successfully against the accounting rules that would require marking assets to 21 
 
current values and for accounting rules that would enable certain assets to be 
carried at historical cost despite subsequent adverse economic developments.   
  That renders reported capital ratios a very flawed indicator of economic 
risk and potential insolvency.  A study of the 123 US banks that failed in 2008 and 
the first three quarters of 2009 found that, two quarters before the takeover, 
they had a median total risk-based capital ratio of 7% (and average of 9.4%), and 
that there was no statistically significant relationship between reported capital 
ratios and the losses to the Insurance Fund that FDIC estimated at the time of 
closure.  Increased capital requirements and leverage limits might serve to reduce 
failures to some degree, but no one should underestimate the ability of banks to 
determine their own risk levels whatever the regulations say. 
   That leads us back to government policy and regulatory performance.  This 
entire process began with very loose monetary policy, maintained for several 
years as the economy recovered from the dot.com bust, that created the 
foundation for a housing boom.  It was fed by a government housing policy that 
continually pushed for lower lending standards to turn renters into home owners, 
even those whose marginal financial condition meant they could safely afford 
only rentals.  This was in my view probably the most important single factor in the 
whole debacle.  It came about because Congress desired to subsidize particular 
groups without direct on-budget expenditures but indirectly through regulation 
and guarantees – thereby denying the existence of any subsidization….until the 
whole scheme collapsed.  And the benefit, to be compared to the enormous cost?  
The household home ownership percentage rose from 67.5% at the beginning of 
2001 to 68.4% at the beginning of 2007; it is now back down to 67.6%. 22 
 
 
IV. SYSTEMIC RISK REGULATION 
  Why did bank regulators and monetary policymakers and the Congressional 
housing committees get it so disastrously wrong?  The currently popular answer is 
that what we needed was a Systemic Risk Regulator (SRR) and “macro-prudential” 
regulation. The SRR would collect vast amounts of information—rather 
unspecified—from very many quite large, “systemically important” firms—also 
unspecified.  The SRR might issue advice or warnings about perceived developing 
risks or concentrations to financial firms and their regulators, which seems to be 
the EU approach.  But in the US Administration version it would have sweeping 
powers to force those firms to alter their operations in some way, to prevent the 
occurrence of an event that might lead to systemic collapse.  So there are two 
separate, and separable, parts of the concept, which we should examine.  The US 
debate often seems to be about who or what would be the SRR, but that is 
probably not of great interest outside the Beltway, and I will put it aside.  How 
would it work? 
  It is certainly feasible to impose extensive reporting requirements, if you 
know what you want and are indifferent to costs, on firms that you have 
somehow picked out as the ones that are ‘systemically important’.  And I agree 
with the proposition that the individual participants in this meltdown did not have 
sufficient information across various products about the holdings of others to 
help them assess the correlations and risk of their own positions and those of 23 
 
potential counterparties, assuming they were given access to such detail.  But 
there are two reservations: 
    1) I know of no macromodels of systemic risk that incorporate 
financial intermediaries.  When the SRR gets all that required information, how 
can it reliably analyze it?  How can it know that it has even gotten the right 
information? 
    2) Without a tested model and a fair degree of certitude, how does 
the SRR (in the strong version) successfully order those large systemically 
important firms to change their business operations or their financial structure?  
It is safe to predict that they would exert political counter pressure.  Regulatory 
agencies in the past (and present) in the US have not been particularly bold in 
going counter to Congressional desires. 
  At a more basic level, is the real problem just one of information?   What 
was the essential information that was not available to the Fed and bank 
regulators that would have led them to have forestalled the present crisis?  The 
fundamental information about HPA, declining lending standards, and the growth 
of opaque MBS based securitization was no secret.  [Slide 8]  In hindsight of 
course it all becomes clear.  But at the time, with a very few exceptions, it was 






  To my mind, lack of power and authority to regulate has not been the heart 
of the problem—lack of foresight and judgment about the unexpected is.  
Regulators, even a SRR, are no more endowed with superior foresight on taking 
office than others.  And that is not intended as a criticism of individuals.  The state 
of economic theory and knowledge about the occurrence of systemic risk does 
not match the lofty goal of saying we are going to prevent it from happening. 
    Twenty years ago, to deal with the US S&L collapse, the Administration put 
through legislation to pay the bill (a mere $150 billion) and of course provide new 
regulation.  The then Treasury Secretary testified that “Two watchwords guided 25 
 
us as we prepared a plan to solve the problem—NEVER AGAIN”.  And naturally 
politicians are saying the same thing again today, while repeating some of the 
same errors in their control of the FHA and its exploding volume of government 
guarantees for mortgage loans.  (Its capital is now down to 0.53%, which would 
be terminally undercapitalized for a private bank.) 
  I would suggest that we not count entirely on preventing major financial 
failures from happening again, in a manner no one now foresees.  A good part of 
our thinking and efforts should be directed toward better methods of resolving 
such failures when they do occur.  The whole exercise is how to allocate the 
losses, not to taxpayers but to private participants in the failed firm, in a way 
consistent with maintaining incentives for market discipline while minimizing to 
the extent possible spillover costs.  That is the topic, and the reason, for this 
workshop today. 
 
       